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Restructuring the Asylum Process
IRA J. KURZBAN*
This article critically analyzes present and proposed asylum
procedures. The author directs his attention to three significant
problems in the asylum process: Structural defects within both
the INS and the State Department's Bureau of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA); the conflict between the
bureaucractic goals of the INS and legal norms; and finally, the
maintenance of a foreign policy contrary to eliminating asylum
flight. The author proposes significant changes in the asylum pro-
cess, which would meet the organizational objectives of the INS
while protecting asylum applicants from the erroneous denial of
their claims. The author further proposes the elimination of the
role of the district director and the BHRHA in the asylum process;
the maintenance of federal and administrative review; and a
change in the burden and standard of proof to require an appli-
cant to prove a prima facie case for asylum subject to INS
rebuttal.
As the United States increasingly becomes a country of first
asylum, particularly for people of the Caribbean and Central
America, the conflict between our political ideology and bureau-
cratic goals in the treatment of persons seeking entry into the
United States as their first country of asylum becomes more ap-
parent. Our inability to establish a policy on matters pertaining
to these people, however, does not arise merely from the vicissi-
tudes of public opinion or changes in federal administration.
Rather, it primarily arises from the traditional structural defects
within the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the
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Department of State, the conflict between bureaucratic goals and
legal norms, and the maintenance of a foreign policy contrary to
the elimination of factors causing asylum flight. This article ana-
lyzes these factors and suggests an alternative form for determin-
ing asylum claims that seek to reduce both the risk of error and
the utilization of duplicative and non-error correcting procedures
which are presently part of the asylum process.
THE PRESENT AsYLUM STRUCTURE
The Refugee Act of 1980 (Refugee Act)' specifically directs the
Attorney General to establish procedures for granting asylum to
aliens physically present in the United States or at land borders
or ports of entry if the aliens fall within the definition of refugee
established by section 208(a) of the Refugee Act.2 Pursuant to
this congressional directive, the Department of Justice promul-
gated interim regulations on June 2, 1980.3 These regulations,
which were recently finalized,4 establish a complex regulatory
scheme for the processing of asylum applications.
At present, the asylum applicant is provided two separate pro-
cedures for seeking asylum if deportation or exclusion proceed-
ings have not been initiated. The applicant may apply to the
district director of the INS for political asylum and may, if denied,
renew that request before an immigration judge. Unlike the for-
mer procedure, which required the district director to make a de-
cision even after deportation or exclusion proceedings had been
initiated, the new regulations only permit the applicant to apply
to the district director if he is not "under exclusion proceedings"
1. The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. (Codified as 8
U.S.C. § 1157-1159 (1980)) [hereinafter cited as the Refugee Act].
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1980). The term "refugee" is defined in § 101(a) (42) of
the Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
(A) Any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality is outside any coun-
try in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable
or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that coun-
try because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular so-
cial group, or political opinion, or
(B) In such circumstances as the President after appropriate consulta-
tion (as defined in section 207(e) of this Act) may specify, any per-
son who is within the country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, within the country in which
such person is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has
a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
3. 45 Fed. Reg. 37,392 (1980).
4. 46 Fed. Reg. 45,116 (1981).
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or "served with an order to show cause.
'5
If exclusion or deportation proceedings have not begun, the asy-
lum process will be initiated before the district director. He is re-
quired to interview the applicant within forty-five days of the
applicant's filing an 1-589 form.6 Thereafter, he is directed to send
the application, with supporting documents, to the Bureau of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA) at the State
Department.7 Upon sending the application to the BHRHA, the
district director is required to note whether he believes the appli-
cation is meritorious, without merit, or undetermined, and to in-
clude questions or areas of doubt for State Department
investigation.8 If the district director receives no response from
BHIRHA within forty-five days of the time that BHRHA received
the request, he is directed to adjudicate the petition on its merits
unless BHRHA requests additional time.9 If an asylum request is
denied, the district director must "expeditiously" place the alien
under exclusion proceedings, or if in deportation, grant voluntary
departure or commence deportation proceedings.O The district
director's decision must be in writing" and no appeal is available
from it. If the district director's decision is based in whole or in
part on the BHRHA report, the statement must be made part of
the record unless it is classified.
As stated, if the asylum request is denied by the district direc-
tor, an applicant may renew it before an immigration judge. A re-
quest before an immigration judge is also to be considered a
request for withholding exclusion or deportation pursuant to sec-
tion 243(h) of the Refugee Act.12 The Board of Immigration Ap-
5. 8 C.F.R. § 208.1 (1981).
6. An 1-589 application is the form designated by the INS for making a re-
quest for political asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2 (1981).
7. INS O.1. § 208.9(a) (b). At the interview, the district director may also in-
form the applicant that his claim is unsubstantiated and give him the option to
withdraw it. However, if the applicant does not wish to do so, the district director
must process it. See INS O.L § 208.5.
8. INS 0.L § 208.9(d) (1980).
9. INS O.L § 208.9(c) (1980).
10. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f) (3)-(4) (1981).
11. As the decision must be in writing, 8 C.F.R. § 103 (1981) would apply and
particularly § 103.2(b) (2) [right of rebuttal] and § 103.3(a) [specific reasons for de-
nial must be stated].
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h) (Supp. IV 1980). 8 C.F.R. § 208.3 (1981). See also Matter
of Castellon, LD. No. 2847 (1981); Matter of Saban, LD. No. 2870 (1981); Matter of
Martinez-Romero, LD. No. 2872 (1981). Section 243(h) states, in relevant part-
The Attorney General shall not deport or return an alien... to a country
peals (BIA), however, has recognized that some differences exist
between a request for asylum and a request for withholding of de-
portation pursuant to section 243(h).13 After the judge receives
an asylum application he is required to request an advisory opin-
ion from the BHRHA if no previous opinion was obtained from
the district director or if, in his discretion, he believes that condi-
tions have substantially changed since the original BHRHA opin-
ion was obtained.14 Subsequent to obtaining the BHRHA opinion,
the judge must hold an adversary hearing where the claim will be
determined. If asylum or section 243(h) relief or both are denied,
the applicant may appeal the denial to the BIA.
In sum, the present regulations provide for a bifurcated asylum
process, with both aspects being heavily dependent upon the de-
termination made by the Department of State through BHRHA.
Given this lengthy and complicated asylum process, serious ques-
tions have been raised as to the efficacy of the process to both the
asylum applicant and the INS.15
PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
The Reagan Administration has proposed certain radical
changes in the asylum process which would dramatically affect
the applicant's ability to seek asylum as well as his ability to re-
view the correctness of an asylum decision.16 The present pro-
posed changes include the elimination of the present asylum
process and its replacement by "asylum officers," designated by
the INS, who would hold nonadversary asylum interviews and
make final determinations of asylum claims.17 These asylum of-
ficers would presumably be specially, although not exclusively,
trained to conduct asylum interviews. They would issue final de-
cisions which could be reviewed only if the Attorney General or
if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would
be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion.
13. Although the BIA in Matter of Lam, LD. No. 2857 (1981) and Matter of Mar-
tinez-Romero, LD. No. 2872 found no practical difference in the standard to be ap-
plied in determining asylum as opposed to § 243(h) relie; the BIA in Lam did find
that relief under § 243(h) is different than asylum because the former is country
specific. In addition, the 'rfim resettlement doctrine" as well as the discretionary
authority to grant or deny a valid asylum claim are not applicable to § 243(h) re-
lief. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.8(f) (ii), 208.14 (1981).
14. 8 C.F.R. § 208.10(b) (1981).
15. Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Pol-
icy, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, October 14, 1981, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
16. Proposed Omnibus Immigration Act, S.1765 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981), 127
CONG. REC. 11993-12002 (daily ed. October 22, 1981) continued in 127 CoNG. REC.
12065-85 (daily ed. October 23, 1981).
17. Id.; Title IV at § 403. Although the alien may have his counsel present to
provide advice, the counsel "shall not otherwise participate in the interview."
94
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the Commissioner of INS certified the decision for review.'8 An
applicant for asylum would only have fourteen days to file an ap-
plication for asylum from the time he is brought under exclusion
or deportation proceedings, and failure to do so, as a practical
matter, would be fatal.19 All appeals to the United States District
Court for de novo review or appeals to the United States Court of
Appeals would be eliminated. A decision by the Commissioner
could only be set aside if found to be "arbitrary and capricious" in
a proceeding challenging the validity of a final exclusion or depor-
tation order.20 The burden of proof is specifically placed upon the
applicant.2 ' Other matters, such as the actual burden of persua-
sion or the participation of the State Department, are not ad-
dressed although the proposed act specifically states "[t]he
procedures set forth in this section shall be the sole and exclusive
procedures for determining asylum."2 2 Finally, the legislation
calls for the abolition of section 243(h) .
GOVExMENTAL ANALYSIS
The Administration's basis for establishing this radically abbre-
viated asylum process derives both from its analysis of the moti-
vation of asylum applicants and the sheer numbers of persons
who are now seeking to enter the United States as their first
country of asylum. Many of the asylum applicants are viewed as
using the asylum process merely as a subterfuge to remain in the
United States as long as possible.24 Additionally, the now often
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. Under the proposed legislation, a denial of an asylum application may
only be appealed in exclusion proceedings to the U.S. District Court and in depor-
tation proceedings to the U.S. Court of Appeals as part of a final order of deporta-
tion or exclusion. Persons in exclusion proceedings who are undocumented are
deprived of even these appellate rights. Additionally, the proposed statute effec-




23. Id. at § 406.
24. Proposed Omnibus Immigration Act" Hearings on S.1765 Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration & Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Statement of Doris M. Meissner, Comm'r of the INS
on Cuban-Haitian Refugee Policy, July 31, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Meissner]:
The procedures we propose would result in both fair and efficient adjudi-
cation of admissibility and asylum claims. Individuals with valid claims
would receive timely relief and those whose claims lack merit would be
prevented from subverting immigration processing through procedural de-
repeated phrase that we have "lost control of our borders,"25 typi-
fies the concern over the recent significant increase in asylum ap-
plications. By fiscal year 1980, 19,485 applications for asylum were
received, and the number of pending applications is now in ex-
cess of 60,000.26 This has led Attorney General Smith to state that
"in the face of these circumstances our policies and procedures
for dealing with asylum applicants ... have crumbled under the
burden of overwhelming numbers."27
This analysis of the present asylum process as a justification for
radically restricting the right of first asylum, however, is insub-
stantial. The claim that asylum is being used as a subterfuge tells
us very little about the deficiencies in the present process. Al-
though certain individuals may abuse the right to claim asylum,
what does this type of claim tell us about the process as a whole?
Does this type of claim say anything more than that the asylum
process, like any other system, is subject to abuse? To the degree
that this rhetorical question makes a claim that the procedures
are subject to abuse, clearly, anything short of complete elimina-
tion would be subject to the same attack.28
The real claim that appears to be advanced is that the present
process may be subject to greater abuse because of the ability to
appeal one's case, thereby creating longer delays. The Adminis-
tration's citation to statistics and the political message that "we
have lost control of our borders," however, are completely unre-
lated to the appellate abuse which the Administration inferen-
tially suggests. The 60,000 applications presently pending are not
applications at the appellate level. Rather they are applications at
the entry level. Therefore, to the degree that a problem does exist
in the backlog of applications, it does not exist at the appellate
lays. Under the conditions we currently face such streamlined proce-
dures are absolutely essential if we are to protect the integrity of our
immigration system and preserve the framework that Congress has estab-
lished to govern the inspection and admission of persons seeking asylum.
(Emphasis added).
25. Proposed Omnibus Immigration Act- Hearings on S.1765 Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration & Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and
the House Subcomm. on Immigration Re: Refugees and International Law, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Statement of William French Smith)-July 30, 1981:
In recent years our policies intended to effect that necessary control of
our borders have failed ... We have lost control of our borders. We have
pursued unrealistic policies. We have failed to enforce our laws
effectively.
26. Id. at 14.
27. Id. at 14-15.
28. Speculation made several years ago by INS officials that Mexicans would
abuse the asylum process and begin to claim political asylum by the thousands
because the Haitians were has never occurred. See Court Transcripts, Haitian
Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 501 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
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level. The use of statistics, and indeed, the underlying analysis of
the Administration, fails to supply a reasoned basis for the radical
paring of appellate and review rights presently proposed. Obvi-
ously, to the degree that a problem exists at the entry level, the
radical reduction of appellate and review rights will do little to al-
leviate that problem.
The Administration's analysis also perpetuates the myth that
asylees are not fleeing their own country but simply seeking to
come to the United States. In bureaucratic terms this has been
described as a "pull" as opposed to a "push" factor. This ap-
proach, of course, completely ignores the pattern of migration and
flight of asylees, only some of whom find their way to the United
States. For example, the people of Haiti are literally a people in
exile. Between fifteen and twenty percent of the entire popula-
tion of Haiti is in exile.29 These people, however, do not only
come to the United States. There are Haitians in the Dominican
Republic, in the Bahamas, in Cuba, in Canada, in Venezuela, in
Mexico and in France. There were, for example, more Haitian
doctors and Haitian psychiatrists in Montreal, Canada by 1971
than there were Haitian doctors and psychiatrists in all of Haiti,
and there were more Haitian economists working for interna-
tional organizations by 1971 than there were Haitian economists
in Haiti.30 The same pattern is emerging with reference to El
Salvadorians. There are presently substantial numbers of El
Salvadorians throughout Central America including Honduras,
Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Mexico. Moreover, the numbers of first
asylees arriving in the United States, although significantly on the
rise in the past two years, represent a statistically small number
of immigrants when placed within the context of refugee and
other admissions during any fiscal year. For example, in the past
several fiscal years, we have admitted over one hundred thousand
Indochinese refugees each year.3 1 In comparison, the number of
Haitians who have sought to immigrate to the United States in
the past ten years has only reached approximately half the yearly
allocation of Indochinese.
3 2
29. Address of Father William Smart delivered at the Conference on the Soli-
darity of the Haitian People in Panama City, Panama, September 18, 1981.
30. HEINl, WRITTEN IN BLOOD (1978).
31. See REPORT OF PRESIDENT TO CONGRESS ON THE ALLOCATION OF REFUGEE
QUOTAS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1980, 1981, 1982.
32. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Cuban-Haitian Task Force, MONTHLY
REPORTS ON CUBAN-HArrIAN IMMIGRATION (1981).
In sum, the analysis of the Administration now being used to
justify the radical reduction in appellate and review rights is defi-
cient. It utilizes entry level statistics, which have no relationship
to the appellate process, as a justification for streamlining the ap-
pellate process. More importantly, the analysis fails to touch
upon the substantial and long standing structural weaknesses in
the INS and the Department of State which have contributed to
the present perceived dilemma.
STRucTuRAL DEFECTS IN PROCESSING AsYLUm APPLICATIONS
The present asylum case backlog of over 60,000 cases, although
unrelated to the appellate and review processes that asylum ap-
plicants may use, is related to the inherent structural defects in
the INS and the Department of State. As previously stated, the
INS utilizes a bifurcated asylum process whereby an applicant
may apply both to the district director and the immigration judge
for the same relief. Both processes, however, are inextricably
linked to the State Department's determination, through the
BHRHA, of the genuineness of an asylum claim. The recommen-
dations of the State Department, with extraordinarily few excep-
tions, are followed by the district director. The director's decision
not to grant asylum will, in turn, be followed by the immigration
judge who will have before him a copy of the State Department's
negative recommendation. The chain of events is thus estab-
lished. Rather than have any independent agencies or procedures
which might reduce the risk of error, the three entities-BHRHA,
district director, immigration judge-are merely duplicative.
Thus, a negative finding by the State Department in virtually all
cases will result in a denial of an asylum claim.
This duplicative, but non-error correcting process, is com-
pounded by structural defects in the State Department's ability to
meaningfully determine asylum applications. Congress has rec-
ognized the long standing inability of the State Department, even
with very limited numbers of applications, to make a meaningful
inquiry into an asylum claim.33 The present system theoretically
relies heavily upon American Embassies throughout the world to
verify facts alleged by individual asylum applicants. Unfortu-
nately, United States consular officers, often limited in number,
do not have the time or resources to effectively investigate every
asylum claim. The determination of asylum applications is there-
fore often left to the vicissitudes of either the desk officer in the
33. SuBcoM. ON IMIGRATION, CrIZENSHIP AND INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JuDiciARY REPORT ON HAriTAN EMIGRATION, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8-9 (Comm. Print 1976).
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State Department or the State Department's general policy to-
ward a particular country. This structural defect results in proce-
dures which are unequivocally contrary to our stated policy of
determining each individual refugee application on its own mer-
its.34 As a result, the courts have roundly questioned and criti-
cized the impartiality, utility and admissibility of State
Department reports in the asylum process. 35 In Kasravi v. INS,36
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found
the competency of the State Department reports highly question-
able and stated:
Such letters from the State Department do not carry the guarantees of re-
liability which the law demands of admissible evidence. A frank, but offi-
cial discussion of the political shortcomings of a friendly nation is not
always compatible with the high duty to maintain advantageous diplo-
matic relations with nations throughout the world... f N]o hearing officer
or court has the means to know the diplomatic necessities of the moment
in the light of which the statements must be weighed.
3 7
Despite these obvious shortcomings, the INS continues to give
great deference to the State Department's reports and recommen-
dations.38 The disastrous consequences of these policies have
been most evident in the treatment accorded Haitian asylum ap-
plicants entering the United States.3 9 Despite the several layers
of interviews and adversary proceedings, the asylum applicant is
offered little, if any, protection by these policies. Placed in a bu-
reaucratic stream of procedures which are duplicative, but non-er-
ror correcting, the applicant's chance that an erroneous denial of
his valid claim for asylum will be detected is not increased by
these procedures. This bureaucratic failure to distinguish be-
34. The position that claims should be determined on a case-by-case basis was
most recently reaffirmed in the testimony of the Acting Comm'r of the INS
wherein she stated: "The Attorney General has instructed the Service to make de-
terminations on a case-by-case basis .... These proposed procedures insure that
each claim is adjudicated on an individual basis." Statement of Meissner, Septem-
ber 16, 1981, Hearings on Refugee Consultation before the Subcomm. on Immigra-
tion, Refugees and International Law, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1981).
35. See Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055 (2d Cir. 1976); Khalil v. INS, 457 F.2d 1276
(9th Cir. 1972); Hosseinmardi v. INS, 405 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1968); Kasravi v. INS, 400
F.2d 673, 677 n.1 (9th Cir. 1968).
36. 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968).
37. Id. at 677 n.1.
38. See Meissner's testimony of September 16, 1981 in regard to the processing
of Indochinese refugees "[t]he Service had been additionally instructed to accord
substantial weight to the views of the Department of State.. .," supra note 34.
39. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 422, 482-93 (S.D. Fla.
1980).
tween a system which is duplicative and non-error correcting and
one which is redundant and error correcting is fatal.40 Conse-
quently, neither the asylum applicant nor the INS are benefited
by the present procedures. To the contrary, the procedures in-
crease the cost and time of adjudicating entry level applications
without insuring that erroneous denials of asylum claims by State
Department officials, district directors or immigration judges will
be detected.
These problems are heightened by the applicant's inability to
present effectively his asylum claim. Both the United Nations
High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR)41 and our own federal
courts 42 have recognized the extraordinarily difficult and disad-
vantageous position that an alien seeking asylum must face. An
asylum applicant finds himself "in an alien environment and may
experience serious difficulties, technical and psychological in sub-
mitting his case to the authorities.., often in a language not his
own."4 3 To the degree that an applicant may have difficulty in
presenting his claim, thereby increasing the chance that his claim
will not be fully understood, duplicative but non-error correcting
procedures merely add to the applicant's confusion and misun-
derstanding without diminishing the risk of an erroneous denial
of his claim.
THE CONFICT BETWEEN BUREAUCRATIC GoALs AND LEGAL NoRms
The second major obstacle that prevents a facile solution to the
utilization of appropriate procedures for first asylum applicants is
the conflict between the goals of the INS as a bureaucracy and
the legal norms which proscribe certain aspects of its conduct.
The potential conflict between the pursuit of organizational goals
and the broad pursuit of societal values, including those ex-
pressed through our legal standards, has long been recognized in
the literature of public administration.4 4 This form of conflict is
unmistakably apparent in INS treatment of the refugee applica-
tion process. Both the district director and the immigration judge
have extraordinary pressure to expedite the processing of asylum
applications to ease the backlog of applications generated in re-
40. See Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and
Overlap, 29 Pub. Ad. Rev. 89 (1969).
41. UNrrED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCE-
DURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 189-194. [Hereinafter
cited as HANDBOOK].
42. See Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1977); Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d
1055, 1062 (2d Cir. 1976); See also Matter of Martinez-Romero, LD. No. 2872 at 6
(1981); Matter of Sihasale, 11 L&N. Dec. 531 (1966).
43. See HANDBOOK, supra note 41.
44. See SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1957).
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cent years. 45 As an agency, the immigration bureaucracy is re-
warded to the degree it can increase activity in deciding and
"statisticizing" cases.4 6 Unlike other areas of immigration law
such as the granting of adjustment of status, the determination of
preference petitions or the approval of certain nonimmigrant
visas, the adjudication of asylum applications poses extraordinary
obstacles to the goals of efficient adjudication due to the interrela-
tionship between the Department of State and the INS on asylum
matters. This process has been viewed as "tortuously slow" by
INS officials. 47 The rational action of the INS, when faced with
this process, is to review and determine expeditiously the entry
level asylum applications and to "push off" the applications to the
next highest level of organization-the BIA. This type of action
results in furthering the organizational goals of "statisticizing"
asylum cases. By initiating the process to remove them from the
entry level, bureaucratic goals are satisfied because cases are "ad-
judicated" irrespective of the manner in which they are
determined.48
There is, however, an inevitable conflict between these goals
and the maintenance of legal norms.49 The INS drive to eliminate
cases subordinates legal norms to bureaucratic goals. The immi-
gration bureaucracy's unlawful appearance in a number of cases
concerning asylum processing is not the result of error in deci-
sionmaking but arises precisely because of rational bureaucratic
45. That extraordinary pressure could be brought to bear upon a bureaucracy
such as INS in the asylum process was made apparent in Haitian Refugee Center
v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 422 (S.D. Fla. 1980) where the district director and immi-
gration judges were directed to expedite the processing of asylum applications be-
cause the "most practical deterrent to this 'Haitian problem' is expulsion ... we
will get the cases moved to hearings swiftly and keep things moving." (Memo of
Charles Sava). Id. at 514.
46. Presently, the Central Office of the INS and the Chief Administrative Law
Judge of INS are considering a procedure which would make the implicit goals of
expeditiously determining cases into an explicit rating system for Immigration
Judges. 58 INTERPRETIVE RELEASES 446 (1981).
47. See Meissner, supra note 24. In her testimony before the U.S. Senate, the
Acting Comm'r of Immigration recently stated:
Under current regulations, an alien may apply for asylum to a District Di-
rector of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Each application for
asylum made to an INS District Director is forwarded to the Department
of State for an individual advisory opinion before being adjudicated by the
INS ... The consequences of this tortuously slow adjudication process
has been disastrous.
48. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 510-32 (S.D. Fla.
1980).
49. Id.
action. From the standpoint of the immigration bureaucracy, the
unlawful treatment accorded applicants of first asylum in the
United States is not a mistake nor a product of negligence. The
repeated condemnation of the INS' illegal conduct with respect to
first asylum applicants is the result of the rational pursuit of orga-
nizational goals over social values or legal norms. It is, therefore,
no surprise that in case after case the INS' conduct has been se-
verely criticized by the judiciary.0
Of course, a successful legal challenge to the process ultimately
makes the pursuit of these organizational goals irrational, as the
INS is required to take expensive corrective action under court
order. It is, however, only irrational to the degree that legal ac-
tion is brought and that such action is successful. If legal action
is precluded as the present administration bill suggests, then the
INS is free to pursue its organizational goals even if they are
illegal.51
THE GHOSTS OF FOREIGN PoLICY
Any analysis of the difficulties that the INS is presently encoun-
tering in regard to persons of first asylum would be incomplete
without mention of the relationship between foreign policy and
asylee migration. Although the courts have recognized the deli-
cate balance between foreign policy considerations and the adju-
dication of asylum applications,5 2 commentators have ignored the
50. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith No. 81-1084A-CIV (N.D. Ga. 1981) (deten-
tion policy of Cuban refugees held unlawful); Louis v. Meissner, No. 81-1260-CIV-
ALH (S.D. Fla. 1981) (mass processing of Haitian exclusion cases preliminarily en-
joined); Nat'l Council of Churches v. Shenefield, No. 79-2959-CIV-WMH (S.D. Fla.
1980) (mass revocation of work authorizations for asylum applicants found unlaw-
ful); Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (mass
processing of Haitian asylum applicants found unlawful); Sannon v. U.S., 460 F.
Supp. 458 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (INS' failure to follow the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976), resulting in injunction of exclusion hearings).
51. It appears to be the intent of the present Administration to preclude the
present methods of judicial review in asylum matters. Meissner has testified that:
"Judicial review of asylum decisions would be available only as part of the judicial
review of final orders of exclusion and deportation. There would be no judicial re-
view of asylum denials of cases of undocumented aliens subject to exclusion." See
Meissner, supra note 24. These suggestions are an obvious attempt to prevent any
impediments to the realization of the organizational goal of expeditiously treating
asylum applications, even if such treatment is unlawful. Review will be com-
pletely eliminated as in the case of undocumented asylum applicants or permitted
after the organizational goals of expeditious determination are met. This con-
trasts significantly with the present legal process which permits the injunction of
such unlawful conduct as it is occurring. See Louis v. Meissner, No. 81-1260-CIV-
ALH (S.D. Fla. 1981); Nat'l Council of Churches v. Shenefield, No. 79-2959-CIV-
WMH (S.D. Fla. 1980); Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.
Fla. 1980).
52. See Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968).
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relationship between foreign policy and the creation of asylum
applicants. In the past decade the relationship between foreign
policy and the creation of asylees has become more apparent.
The politicization of the asylum process, as in the case of Cuba,
and the support of antidemocratic regimes in Haiti, Iran and El
Salvador have substantially contributed to the creation of asylees
in the United States. In some sense, these asylees represent the
ghosts of our foreign policy and the failure of the asylum process.
The description of the Mariel boatlift as a "freedom flotilla", while
describing Haitians and El Salvadorians as "economic refu-
gees"--a term which literally has no meaning because one is ei-
ther a refugee or not under the terms of the Refugee Act53--
demonstrates to how great an extent the entire asylum process
has been politicized. Indeed, the Mariel boatlift was nothing more
than a horrifying consequence of the inherent contradictions,
which Cuba so skillfully played upon, of our policy to embarrass
the Cuban regime by continuing to accept Cuban asylees irre-
spective of their ability to come within the definition of an asylee
or a section 243(h) applicant.
RESTRUCTURING THE ASYLUM PROCESS
If the present asylum process is duplicative without the advan-
tages of correcting any errors which may arise in an asylum de-
termination, the proposal presently before Congress is lopsided in
that it seeks to reduce duplication without offering any measures
to insure the reduction of the risk of an erroneous denial of an
asylum claim. The present legislative proposal, if enacted, would
have a number of ramifications: it would cut off judicial review, it
would force an applicant, due to the shortness of time, to file an
unprepared claim thereby justifying a denial, and lastly it would
make the asylum officer, the judge, jury and prosecutor without
the full benefit of judicial process. The complete absence of any
error correcting mechanism to challenge an erroneous denial of
an asylum claim when coupled with the need of asylum officers to
conform to goals of expeditiously determining asylum claims,
whatever the cost, deprives the applicant of a fundamentally fair
procedure. A more appropriate procedure would seek to accom-
modate organizational goals of expeditious treatment with the
protection of those applicants who truly have valid claims for asy-
53. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-1159 (1980).
lum. Such protection could be accomplished through error cor-
rection mechanisms. The failure to provide such mechanisms,
however, would simply mean that applicants with valid claims
would be swept up in the mass processing and closure of asylum
cases when pressure is brought, as it has been,5 4 on the INS to
eliminate case backlogs.
Error Suppression in Bureaucratic Organizations
Organizational theory has long recognized the value of redun-
dant systems, as opposed to tightly ordered systems, within an or-
ganization as a means of suppressing or reducing error.55 Martin
Landau in an often cited paper56 explains how redundancy in the
sense of duplication and overlap of function may be a prime asset
in an organization if it serves to reduce error. The suppression or
reduction of error is achieved to the degree that duplicative or
overlapping systems prevent the breakdown of the whole system
when one of the parts fails. This concept is suggested in Landau's
statement of a theory by Von Neumann "that the probability of
failure in a system decreases exponentially as redundancy factors
are increased."5 7 Landau draws the analogy to the braking sys-
tem of an automobile and states "if there is no duplication, if
there is no overlap, if there is no ambiguity, an organization will
neither be able to suppress error nor generate alternate roots of
actions."58
Error Suppression in Law
Over the past two decades a comparable theory of error sup-
pression has evolved in the courts. The United States Supreme
Court recognized more than twenty years ago "that there is al-
ways in litigation a margin of error representing error in fact find-
ing." 59 The Court recognized that one method to rectify
erroneous fact determinations is to adjust the standard and bur-
den of proof to the likelihood of error and interest at stake. Jus-
tice Brennan articulated this approach when he stated that
"where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value-
54. See Nat'l Council of Churches v. Shenefield, No. 79-2959-CIV-VJMH (S.D.
Fla. 1980); Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
55. See ORGANIZED SocIAL CouPLXrrY (Laporte ed. 1975); Landau, supra
note 40; W. Alonso, Predicting With Imperfect Data, 34 J. Am. Inst. Plan. 248-55
(1968); MODERN SYSTEMS RESEARCH FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST (W. Buckley
ed. 1968); R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE Fmm (1963).
56. See Landau, supra note 40.
57. Id. at 350.
58. Id. at 356.
59. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
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as a criminal defendant his liberty-his margin of error [in fact
finding] is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the
other party the burden ... of persuading the fact finder."
60 Simi-
larly, in In Re Winship,61 Justice Harlan stated in his concurring
opinion that "[as] the standard of proof affects the comparative
frequency of ... erroneous outcomes, the choice of the standard
to be applied in a particular kind of litigation should, in a rational
world, reflect an assessment of the comparative disutility of
each." More recently, Chief Justice Burger made a similar obser-
vation in Addington v. Texas.62 The Chief Justice, in determining
what standard of proof should be applied in civil commitment
proceedings, stated:
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the
Due Process Clause and in the realm of fact finding is to 'instruct the fact
finder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should
have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adju-
dication.' In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring).
The standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and
to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision ....
Moreover, we must be mindful that the function of legal process is to min-
imize the risk of erroneous decisions.63
Legal commentators have likewise recognized the utility of
shifting or changing the burden or standard of proof as a means of
insuring a fair procedure through a more reasonable allocation of
the risk of error.64
The Use of Shifting Burdens and Standards of Proof in
Immigration
Within the immigration area itself, the BIA and the courts have
recognized the importance of the use of different burdens and
standards of proof for different issues. In Woodby v. INS65 for ex-
ample, in finding that the INS must establish deportability by
"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence," the Court reasoned
that while a deportation proceeding was not. a criminal
prosecution:
it does not syllogistically follow that a person may be banished from his
60. Id. at 525-26.
61. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
62. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1978).
63. Id. at 423. Accord Cooper v. Mitchell Bros., 50 U.S.L.W. 3444 (1981).
64. See Kerner v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1960). See K. DAVIS, ADmIvn-
ISTRATrVE LAW TREATISE § 14.14 (Ist ed. 1958); 4 MEZInES, STEIN & GRUFF, ADMmmis-
TRATrVE LAW § 24.01 (1981).
65. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
country upon no higher degree of proof than applies in a negligence case.
This Court has not closed its eyes to the drastic deprivations that may fol-
low when a resident of this country is compelled by our Government to
forsake all the bonds formed here and go to a foreign land where he often
has no contemporary identification.66
In contrast to the government's burden of proof by clear, con-
vincing and unequivocal evidence in deportation proceedings, an
alien in exclusion proceedings has the burden of proof of estab-
lishing his admissibility into the United States. That burden
never shifts and must be proven by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.67 Similarly, the burden of proof to establish eligibility to
obtain a visa rests upon the applicant.68 Shifting the burden of
proof to the applicant in these two latter cases clearly reflects a
decision that the granting of a visa or the admission of a party
into the United States is a benefit which should be conferred on a
party only if that party can prove his entitlement. It also reflects,
however, the fact that the consequences of an erroneous decision
in deportation is substantially greater (because it results in the
loss of residence akin to banishment) than the initial denial of en-
trance to a person seeking to gain admittance into the country.
The subtlety and delicacy of line drawing in this area is most evi-
dent in the treatment of persons seeking admission to the United
States on the grounds that they are citizens. The BIA has estab-
lished a shifting burden of proof in cases where persons seek ad-
mission to the United States on these grounds. The initial burden
is upon the applicant to prove that he is a citizen; thereafter, the
burden shifts to the government to prove any expatriating acts.
69
Although the government's burden was originally a standard of
proof higher than mere preponderance,7 0 the subsequent estab-
lishment of a preponderance of the evidence test in this area has
been upheld.71
Burden of Proof and Burden of Persuasion in Political Asylum
INS regulations, pursuant to the Refugee Act, specifically place
the burden of proving a claim for asylum on the asylum appli-
cant.72 This is comparable to the burden placed upon the appli-
66. Id. at 285.
67. See Matter of M, 3 L & N. Dec. 777, 781 (Cent. Office 1949).
68. Matter of Brantigan, 11 L & N. Dec. 493, 495 (1966).
69. Matter of G - R, 3 L & N. Dec. 141, 146-48 (1948).
70. Id.
71. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
72. 8 C.F.R. § 208.5 (1981) states:
the burden is on the asylum applicant to establish that he/she is unable
or unvilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or her-
self of the protection of the country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, the country in which such person
[VOL. 19: 91, 1981] Restructuring the Asylum Process
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
cant seeking relief under section 243(h).73 Although there has
been no decision by the federal courts confirming the vitality of
the burden in asylum proceedings, the applicant's burden of proof
under section 243(h) is a matter of long standing.74 Various at-
tempts to shift the burden of proof to the government after some
form of initial primafacie showing by the applicant have been ex-
plicitly75 or implicitly76 rejected.
The standard of proof or burden of persuasion, however, is far
less clear. Although no decision by the BIA or the federal courts
has yet arisen interpreting the standard of proof for an applicant
for asylum under the Refugee Act, substantial authority exists
concerning the quantum of proof necessary to establish a claim
pursuant to section 243(h). This authority, however, is far from
unified. Some courts require that the section 243(h) applicant
prove his claim by a preponderance of the evidence;77 other
courts require proof by "clear probability";78 and still other courts
appear to require a standard of proof so high as to make it impos-
sible to prove a claim.79 At least one circuit of the United States
habitually resided, because of persecution or a well-founded fear of perse-
cution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.
73. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1981) states: "the respondent has the burden of satis-
fying the special inquiry officer that he would be subject to persecution on account
of race, religion or political opinion as claimed."
74. See Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1977); Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531
F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1976); Daniel v. INS, 528 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1976); Rosa v. INS, 440
F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1971); Shkukani v. INS, 435 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1971); Hamad v.
INS, 420 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. de-
nied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968); Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1967); Matter of
Dunar, 14 L&N. Dec. 310 (1973); Matter of Cavlov, 10 L&N. Dec. 94 (1962).
75. See Daniel v. INS, 528 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1976) (expressly rejects claim that
burden rests on INS to disprove claim based on naked assertion of petitioner);
Shkukani v. INS, 435 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1971) (expressly rejects petitioner's argu-
ment that burden should shift to the government after petitioner makes a "reason-
able showing" of an asylum claim).
76. Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1967) (rejects petitioner's argument that
burden by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence should shift to government
to rebut petitioner's prima facie claim).
77. See Henry v. INS, 552 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1977); Daniel v. INS, 528 F.2d 1278
(5th Cir. 1976); Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975); Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102
(9th Cir. 1969).
78. See Martineau v. INS, 556 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1977); Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d
376 (7th Cir. 1977); Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1976); Rosa v. INS,
440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971); Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. de-
nied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968); Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1967); Matter of
Dunar, 14 L & N. Dec. 310 (1973); Matter of Tan, 12 L & N. Dec. 564 (1967).
79. See Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1978) (despite proof that appli-
Court of Appeals appears to have adopted all three standards.80
In addition to meeting the requisite burden and quantum of
proof, whatever the standard, there is some authority to require
an applicant for section 243(h) relief to show a particularized fear
of persecution.8 1 This 'particularized" standard, if followed to the
extreme, can make it extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to
prove an asylum claim.82 Moreover, the utilization of background
or general evidence concerning the political conditions in the ap-
plicant's country of origin is often severely circumscribed by this
standard.8
3
When these factors are coupled with the asylum applicant's
lack of necessary skills84 and restrictive time pressures 85 the pro-
cant fled persecution, must show that government wishes to persecute him today);
Henry v. INS, 552 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1977) (in face of unimpeached testimony and
documentary evidence, court denied claim despite lack of rebuttal evidence by
government); Hamad v. INS, 420 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (despite eyewitness to
facts, court rejected claim stating that petitioner failed to establish that he "would
definitely be persecuted"); Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968) (despite ex-
pert testimony, documentary evidence, and no suggestion of impeachment, the
court upheld § 243(h) denial); Matter of McMullen, LD. No. 2831 (1980) rev'd, Mc-
Mullen v. INS, No. 80-7580, slip op. (9th Cir. 1981).
80. The cases of the U.S. Court of Appeals in the Fifth Circuit are confusing at
best. Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975), Daniel v. INS, 528 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir.
1976), and Henry v. INS, 525 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1977), all appear to adopt the pre-
ponderance of the evidence test. Howeve, a careful reading of Henry indicates
that the Fifth Circuit is requiring, as in Fleurinor, a standard which could never be
met. In Henry, despite the presentation of documentary and testimonial evidence,
the court rejected petitioners' claims in the absence of rebuttal testimony by the
government or a finding of the lack of credibility of petitioners' witnesses. The
same may be said of Paul, where the court upheld the denial of petitioners'
§ 243(h) claim despite the lack of rebuttal evidence by the government or a deter-
mination of the credibility of the petitioner. Lastly, Martineau v. INS, supra note
78, in disregard of any other Fifth Circuit standard, adopted the "clear probability"
test.
81. See Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1978); Henry v. INS, 525 F.2d 130
(5th Cir. 1977); Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1976); Paul v. INS, 521
F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975); Hamad v. INS, 420 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Matter of Tan,
12 L & N. Dec. 564 (1967); U.S. v. Holton, 248 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 932 (1958).
82. See Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1978); Hamad v. INS, 429 F.2d
645 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Matter of McMullen, LD. No. 2831 (1980) rev'd, No. 80-7580, slip
op. (9th Cir. 1981).
83. Ishak v. INS, 432 F.Supp. 624 (N.D. Ill. 1977). See also note 70 =upra. Some
courts, however, have taken a more hospitable view toward the introduction of evi-
dence of general political conditions to assist in proving a particular asylum claim.
See Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977); Fung Foo v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d
715 (2d Cir. 1955); Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla.
1980); Mercer v. Esperdy, 234 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
84. See text supra at 209-10.
85. The filing of even an adequate asylum application, with substantial corrob-
orative evidence is a lengthy process. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503
F. Supp. 442, 522-23 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (transcript of testimony of D. Carliner at 1494-
95). Although present regulations do not specify the time in which an immigration
judge can adjourn a hearing to permit an asylum application to be filed, the prac-
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cess exalts form over substance, or more appropriately, forms
over substance. The difficulties in obtaining corroborative evi-
dence by asylum applicants, long recognized by the BIA and the
courts, 8 6 only adds to the weighted burden which an applicant, as
a practical matter, must presently bear. Also, the restrictive inter-
pretation given to the use of secondary materials 87 adds to the
burden of the applicant. More often than not, these materials are
the only sources of information available to an applicant.
Thus, as a practical matter, an asylum applicant bears a heavily
weighted and unfavorable burden of proof. An applicant's lan-
guage and cultural differences when coupled with his general lack
of knowledge as to the asylum process makes it unlikely that the
applicant will obtain the corroborative evidence necessary to sub-
stantiate his claim. Additionally, even if an applicant could obtain
such corroborative evidence, the gathering of such evidence is a
lengthy and arduous process. With the assistance of a lawyer this
process is extraordinarily difficult; without such assistance it is
nearly impossible. To the degree that an applicant is forced into
filing a claim within ten days of appearing before an immigration
judge or fourteen days from the time he is first brought under ex-
clusion or deportation proceedings, the entire process becomes
nothing more than a "mere gesture to a ritualistic requirement."88
Given the extraordinary burdens placed upon the asylum appli-
tice, in certain areas of the country, has been to grant an applicant only ten days-
the time restriction placed upon the filing of an application under § 243(h). See 8
C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1981). The proposed statute by the present Administration
would require that an application be filed within fourteen days of the initiation of
an exclusion or deportation proceeding. See § 403 of proposed Act. Although this
time period appears to be longer than the ten day grant, it is in fact far shorter,
because the fourteen days begin to run from the time that one is placed under ex-
clusion or deportation proceedings, and not the time that the applicant appears
before an immigration judge. By forcing applicants to file claims within a highly
restrictive time period, thereby depriving the applicant of the ability to file an ef-
fective claim, a high denial rate is assured. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Civi-
letti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 522-23 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
86. See Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977); Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d
1055, 1062 (2d Cir. 1976) ("[ T] he greater the likelihood of persecution in the foreign
country, the less will be the possibility of obtaining information from relatives or
friends who are still there"); Matter of Sihasale, 11 L & N. Dec. 759 (1966).
87. See generally Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1978); Ishak v. INS,
432 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Matter of McMullen, LD. No. 2831 (1980), rev'd, Mc-
Mullen v. INS, No. 80-7580, slip op. (9th Cir. 1981); Matter of Martinez-Romero, I.D.
No. 2872 (1981); Matter of Chumpitazi, 16 L & N. Dec. 629 (1978); Matter of Sihasale,
11 L & N. Dec. 759 (1966). But see Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977); Fung
Foo v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1955).
88. Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966).
cant, a fundamentally fair process requires the reallocation of the
burden and standard of proof, particularly where the conse-
quence of an erroneous decision may lead to persecution or possi-
bly death.
DEVELOPING A MODEL ASYLUM PROCEDURE
The development of an asylum procedure requires recognizing
and accommodating the organizational goals and expeditious
processing of cases by the INS. Such a procedure must also in-
sure that some mechanism is provided which reduces the likeli-
hood of erroneous denials of valid asylum claims. The present
procedures and those proposed by the Administration fail to ac-
commodate either of these goals. At present, there exist too
many duplicative, non-error correcting structures which fail to as-
sist either the INS or the asylum applicant. In contrast, the Ad-
ministration's proposal strips the INS of all redundant systems,
thereby depriving the applicant of even minimal procedural
protections.
The New Asylum Structure
There exists little controversy regarding the need to change the
present asylum structure.89 Certain suggested changes, however,
particularly those which seek to eliminate procedures should be
carefully scrutinized. For example, the Administration has pro-
posed the elimination of section 243(h).90 Under present regula-
tions, an application for political asylum pursuant to section 208 of
the Refugee Act, made during an exclusion hearing or after the
initiation of a deportation hearing, is also considered a request for
withholding deportation under section 243(h).91 In this unified
hearing the applicant under section 243(h) and asylum proceed-
ing must practically present the same type of information to the
same judge under the same procedures. Consequently, from both
a practical and legal standpoint, the "structure" of an asylum and
section 243(h) hearing is the same. The BIA has noted some dif-
ferences between asylum and section 243(h).92 The extent of
these differences, however, do not affect the structure of the
89. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Sen.
Comm on the Judiciary, October 14, 1981, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
90. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
91. Matter of Castellon, LD. No. 2847 (1981) at 7; 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1981).
92. In Matter of Lam, LD. No. 2857 (1981), the BIA found that the principal dif-
ferences between asylum and § 243(h) is one of relief. Relief granted under
§ 243(h) is "country specific" whereas a grant of asylum, in the absence of any
changed conditions in the country of origin, insures that the applicant can remain
in the U.S. and adjust his status to permanent residency after one year.
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processes, but merely the relief. To the degree that section 243(h)
does not create any additional structures, and therefore any addi-
tional organizational burdens on INS, its use as an alternative
form of relief does not impede INS organizational goals. For this
reason section 243(h) should be retained.
The same may not be said of the asylum procedure before the
district director as well as the institutional role of the BHRHA,
within the Department of State. The present reliance upon
BHRHA merely places undue emphasis upon a procedure that, at
best, fails to perform its appropriate function, and at worst, pro-
vides misleading results, Additionally, it does so at a substantial
loss of time to the INS and the applicant, because at a minimum,
both must wait forty-five days to obtain a response or a non-re-
sponse from BHRHA.93 A more sensible procedure would be one
which, as a matter of practice, is often implemented by the State
Department in federal and state litigation. In those cases where
the State Department believes that their opinion should be heard
and noted for the record, they submit a letter or some form of
pleading to the court.94 By leaving it to the discretion of the De-
partment of State to intervene in matters which they think signifi-
cant, the present delay which produces results not beneficial to
either party would be avoided. Presumably, an asylum applicant
or the INS would be free to make a request, in a special case, to
the State Department to intervene as litigants presently do.95
This type of informal, nonbinding procedure would expedite the
present process by permitting the State Department and the liti-
gants, in certain exceptional cases, to seek a full investigation of
an individual claim. This procedure would obviously also have
the additional effect of eliminating substantial backlogs that pres-
ently exist at BHRHA.
Similarly, the elimination of the district director's role in deter-
mining asylum applications would expedite the present process,
while doing little to alter any protections to the asylum applicant.
The present process before the district director as well as the pro-
posed "asylum officer" concept is not intended to provide, from a
93. INS OJ. 208.9(c) (1980).
94. See generally First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759
(1972); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
95. Id.; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 80-7375, slip
op. (2d Cir. 1981).
structural point of view, a fully deliberative process.9 6 Its utility,
as a redundant system, is severely restricted. Moreover, the orga-
nizational incentives to move cases quickly through the district
director's process, as well as the lack of resources and heavy reli-
ance upon BHRHA for guidance, magnifies the nondeliberative,
non-error correcting aspects of the process.
The elimination of BHRHA and the district director from the
asylum process will effectively streamline the present procedures
at no substantial loss to asylum applicants, thereby permitting
INS to meet critical organizational goals. The applicant would
then be left with one hearing before an immigration judge
wherein full procedural safeguards would be guaranteed. He
would be permitted to have an attorney or representative actively
engaged in his case. Also, the applicant would be permitted to ob-
tain and present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and engage
in discovery and other procedures consistent with a full eviden-
tiary hearing. To the degree that discovery is presently limited,
regulations should be adopted which are consistent with present
federal practices.
As an additional safeguard, the immigration judge hearing the
case should be specially designated for that purpose. By separat-
ing the asylum claim from the deportation process, psychological
and organizational pressures to view an asylum claim or request
for section 243(h) relief as a "defense" or delay to deportation
would be curtailed. Requiring immigration judges to sit by spe-
cial designation to hear asylum claims would also eliminate the
need to create any new structure such as "asylum officers" and
could be accomplished with existing resources. The existing body
of immigration judges could hear these asylum claims, the only
limitation being that the "asylum judge" would be different than
the judge hearing the initial exclusion or deportation hearing.
97
A final necessary structural safeguard to enhance the reduction
of erroneous denials of asylum claims is the provision for appel-
late review. The Administration's proposal that an administrative
96. Under the proposed "asylum officer" concept, as well as the present pro-
cess before a district director, the ability of an applicant's attorney or representa-
tive to participate is severely restricted. An applicant's attorney or representative
cannot actively participate in the process, nor can they present evidence on their
client's behalf, nor can they perform any other function for the applicant except
rendering advice.
97. Although not directly related to the issue addressed in this article, the hir-
ing practices of immigration judges should be carefully reviewed and revised. At
present, the position of immigration judge is a promotional position within the INS
itself. All judges are selected from the ranks of service emloyees. If a percentage
of the immigration judges were selected from outside INS there is some likelihood
that long standing prejudices would be alleviated.
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appeal should be limited to those instances where the Commis-
sioner or Attorney General request a review is meaningless. 98 In
contrast, the BIA, although rarely reversing a denial of an asylum
claim, does perform a limited error correcting function. The goal
of expeditious processing by INS would be better served by plac-
ing a time limit upon the filing of an appeal and the determination
of a claim by the BIA, rather than completely eliminating the
BIA.
Additionally, the Administration's proposal to restrict federal
court review solely to an appeal of the final exclusion or deporta-
tion order is ultimately, if made the exclusive remedy, contrary to
the INS organizational goals. The present failure to provide a ju-
risdictional exception for federal review of class-wide abuse 99 pre-
vents the correction of administrative error at its initial stages.100
Such a failure also requires the INS, and ultimately the Depart-
ment of Justice, to litigate each individual case through the appel-
late process at substantial organizational and financial expense.
The only basis for rejecting the class action jurisdictional ex-
ception would be the assumption that individual appeals would
not be taken or would not reveal class-wide errors. These aims,
however, are clearly not legitimate, as their intent is to deprive an
applicant of the benefit of an error correction procedure where his
claim has not been properly heard or lawfully denied.
Changing the Burden of Proof
As stated above, the judiciary has long recognized the use of
the burden of proof as a means of allocating the risk of error in
light of the magnitude and the severity of an erroneous decision.
In asylum matters, there is little question that an erroneous de-
nial has serious consequences, possibly as serious as an errone-
98. In Louis v. Meissner, No. 81-1260-CIV-ALH (S.D. Fla., Oct. 2, 1981), the At-
torney General engaged in just this type of review for applicants who were sub-
jected to mass exclusion proceedings. After reviewing transcripts of
approximately ninety-five Haitians who were ordered excluded at mass hearings
during the week of June 1 or June 5, 1981, the Attorney General determined that
the Haitians knowingly waived their rights to an attorney and to claim political
asylum, and that their exclusion orders were appropriate. After the filing of the
Lucien Louis case in federal court in the Southern District of Florida and after six
days of testimony, the Attorney General, despite his previous decision, agreed that
the Haitians had not been given fair hearings where they knowingly and intelli-
gently understood the process they were subjected to.
99. See note 20 supra.
100. See note 50 supra.
ous finding of guilt in a capital case. In no other area of law, apart
from capital punishment, are the consequences of an erroneous
decision as severe. Asylum applicants, however, are hampered
with obstacles of language, culture and accessability to evidence
not experienced to as great a degree by criminal defendants. In
addition, unlike criminal defendants, an applicant who cannot af-
ford an attorney must represent himself unless he can obtain free
counsel at no expense to the INS.O1 In these circumstances, the
burden of proof should be more equitably distributed to insure
that in the face of expedited procedures there exists some provi-
sion for reducing the risk of an erroneous denial of an asylum
claim.
The burden of proof may be altered in a variety of ways. First,
the burden may be placed upon the government to disprove an
asylum applicant's claim once such claim is made. Second, the
burden may be placed on the applicant to establish a primafacie
case after which time the burden would shift to the government
to disprove the claim.102 Third, the government might establish a
rebuttable presumption that persons arriving in the United States
from certain countries or areas of the world, such as Indochina,
Cuba or Haiti are presumptively asylees, which presumption
could only be overcome by evidence from the government. 03 A
rebuttable presumption may be one of two types: One type of re-
buttable presumption is one which, upon being overcome by con-
trary evidence, simply vanishes-the so called bubble bursting
theory.104 The second type of rebuttable presumption is one
which, after being overcome by affirmative evidence, does not
vanish, but is simply weighed against the rebuttable evidence
101. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1976).
102. The shifting burden of proof upon the showing of a prima facie case, has
recently been reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Title VII cases.
See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981). In Bur-
dine, the court held that a plaintiff in a Title VII action has the burden of proving,
by the preponderance of evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. Thereaf-
ter, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reason for rejecting the employee. Should the defendant carry that burden,
the plaintiff would then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the defendant's reasons were pretextual.
103. Ms. Meissner came close to establishing this type of presumption for In-
dochinese refugees in her testimony on September 16, 1981, concerning In-
dochinese refugees before the Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Immigration, Refugee and Int'l Law, House of Representatives, wherein she
stated: "We believe that only a small percentage of cases will require extensive
handling because the political conditions in Vietnam remain such that the major-
ity of those fleeing will likely be found to be refugees."
104. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1095 n.10
(1981); 4 MEziNEs, STEIN & GRUFF, .mupra note 64, at § 24.36.
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presented.105 Finally, the burden of proof could remain, as it does
presently, on the applicant.1
06
In determining which burden of proof to apply, consideration
should also be given to the standard of proof or burden of persua-
sion within each element of the burden of the proof. For example,
by what standard of proof-preponderance of the evidence or
clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence-must an applicant
prove his prima facie case? Alternatively, what standard is re-
quired to overcome the primafacie case?
An analysis of the four alternatives, with varying standards of
proof/burdens of persuasion, suggest that the most appropriate
standard is the establishment of a prima facie standard. This
standard would be most appropriate because it is consistent with
the compatible resolution of INS organizational goals and the ap-
plicant's need for protection from erroneous denials. Under this
standard, the applicant must prove, by a preponderance of evi-
dence, his prima facie case for asylum, which could be rebutted
by INS proof by something more than the preponderance of the
evidence (but less than clear, unequivocal and convincing evi-
dence) that the applicant does not have a valid asylum claim.
All other alternatives lopsidedly shift the balance in favor of
one side or the other. The first alternative, for example, that the
government would have to disprove every claim for asylum that
was filed, would place an unrealistic financial and administrative
burden upon the INS when frivolous claims were fied. Alterna-
tively, the rebuttable presumption argument, although apparently
applied in practice, undermines the basic principles of the United
Nations Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refu-
gees that asylum claims must be determined on a case-by-case
basis. 07 Additionally, the decision as to which countries would
get preferential treatment would rapidly disintegrate the integrity
of the asylum process and make it merely an appendage of the
Department of State-the very problem sought to be eliminated
by removing BHRHA from the asylum process. Finally, for the
105. See Breeden v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1974); 4 MEZIEs, STEIN
& GRuFF, supra note 64.
106. 8 C.F.R. § 208.5 (1981).
107. There is little doubt that Congress in passing the Refugee Act intended to
incorporate the UN Convention and Protocol standards. See Conf. Rep. on the
Refugee Act of 1980 No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 17-18 (1979); S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-9 (1979).
reasons stated previously, including the handicaps of language,
culture and ability, the present burden of proof on the applicant is
highly inadequate for it unfairly tips the balance in favor of INS.
The establishment of a prima facie case by the preponderance
of the evidence is a reasonable accommodation to all parties. The
applicant does not have a burden of proof which is so high as to
make his ability to obtain asylum merely a matter of judicial or
administrative whim. Alternatively, the INS will only be expected
to utilize its resources when there is, at least, some minimal
showing of the likelihood of persecution. The requirement that
the government respond by something more than the mere pro-
ponderance of the evidence, but less than clear, convincing, and
unequivocal evidence, helps to reduce the risk of an erroneous
denial of a valid asylum claim. A higher standard, while achieving
this end as well, would do so at enormous institutionalized ex-
pense. The utilization of a "clear, convincing and unequivocal"
standard, for example, would require the INS to engage in a level
of fact finding incompatible with its present structure and
resources.
Under a prima facie concept, the government's successful re-
buttal would not, of course, necessarily be fatal. If the INS is suc-
cessful in rebutting the primafacie case by something more than
a preponderance of the evidence, the applicant would still have
the opportunity to present additional evidence. The applicant,
thereafter, could prevail by a preponderance of the evidence.
Time, Place and Manner
In addition to the structural and evidentiary changes outlined
above, the restructuring of the asylum process also requires that
attention be given to matters concerning the timing of asylum
claims, the submission of asylum applications and the conduct of
the asylum hearings. The present time restraints on filing appli-
cations for asylum, and the more restrictive time restraint pro-
posed by the present Administration, make it virtually impossible
to file an adequate asylum claim. As a result, the incomplete asy-
lum application becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, thereby justi-
fying its denial. Given the length of time it would take an
attorney working with a client to file an asylum application,10 8 a
thirty day time limit with the provision for extension for good
cause, would be a practical alternative to the present and pro-
posed restrictions. The time period should run from the time the
108. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 521-22 (S.D. Fla.
1980) (testimony of D. Carliner).
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request for asylum was made and not from the time the alien is
placed in proceedings.
The "place" for holding such hearings should, as previously
stated, be before an immigration judge sitting independently and
separately from the applicant's deportation or exclusion hearing.
Finally, the manner in which such hearings should be con-
ducted has been outlined by the United Nations High Commis-
sioner in the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status. In the Handbook, the interviewer is
to elicit in the most positive manner possible, information which
will assist the applicant's claim. The atmosphere for conducting
such hearings should also be conducive to eliciting the informa-
tion.109 Such procedures would obviously preclude mass hearings
or hearings designed to frustrate the applicant's ability to present
information on his behalf.110
CONCLUSION
The present and proposed asylum processes are inadequate to
meet either the organizational demands of the INS or the appli-
cant's right to a fundamentally fair asylum process. One solution
to the present dilemma is to eliminate duplicative but non-error
correcting asylum procedures while changing the burden and
standard of proof to provide for a more realistic allocation of the
risk of an erroneous denial of an asylum application. Where life
itself may be at stake, great care must be taken to insure that the
likelihood of an erroneous denial of a valid asylum claim is sub-
stantially reduced.
109. HANDBOOK, supra note 41 at §§ 189-205.
110. See Louis v. Meissner, No. 81-1260-CIV-ALH (S.D. Fla., Oct. 2, 1981).

